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IntroductionKant’s practice as a philosophical investigator involved a kind ofintimate and productive interpenetration between the sciencesand philosophy that few contemporaries, conditioned as we areby ever-increasing divisions of intellectual labor, are likely to fullyfathom, let alone emulate. Kant brought metaphysics to bear onbasic problems in mathematical physics, weighed in on contestedquestions concerning preformationism versus epigenesis in bio-logy, as well as questions about human racial diversity, and con-versely drew upon all of the above in formulating his own meta-physical epistemology. Questions about ultimate origins, and ourability to address them, streamed through his entire oeuvre as didthe challenge of securing both the rational grounds of causal “me-chanistic” explanation and of free will. Might there be a value inrevisiting Kant’s style of intellectual/scientific practice and the le-gacy of his contributions to addressing problems of understandinglife in the light of on-going scientific advances? The present paperwill explore exactly that.While it would be fair to say that Kant scholarship has blos-somed in the English-speaking world over the past several dec-ades, it is nonetheless the case that bringing Kant’s legacy to bearas a resource and critical partner in the furthering of biologicalunderstanding in a contemporary context has hardly been broa-ched. Only a small fraction of Kant scholarship has concerned it-self directly with Kant’s engagement with a natural science andwhere such work has been done (and brilliantly so), for example
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by Michael Friedman1 and Eric Watkins2, it has been largely parti-tioned to the side of the physical (as opposed to life) sciences al-though two recent anthologies suggest that this is the process ofchanging3. Interest in Kant’s Third critique in general, and espe-cially on the biological side of this work, has been late in comingand even where a recognized philosophical expert has emerged,e.g., Hannah Ginsborg, it has been largely on the basis of a philoso-phical practice outside of any detailed engagement with the empi-rical life sciences4. The record is rather different when it comes tothose working more in an historical/interpretive than in a prob-lem-solving vain. More will be said about this below. First we willsketch the basic framework bequeathed by Kant to subsequent in-vestigators into the nature of “organized beings”.Simply stated, Kant recognized a very basic dilemma in un-derstanding living organisms. Kant referred to living organisms as“organized beings” precisely because as creatures of nature theyexhibit a kind of organization which requires a special explana-tion. Said organization entails an ability to self-sustain, often togrow and develop, to reproduce and to take-up and incorporatenon- or less-organized matter into that organization that allowsfor all of the above. Kant characterized an entity that performs assuch to be a “natural purpose”. The problem for Kant was thatfrom the point of view of the physics of his time such organizationcould only have come about contingently as there was no physicalprinciple on the basis of which the arrival of such organizationcould be accounted for as a necessary consequence. To view “or-ganized beings” solely on the basis of physical mechanisms wasthus inadequate, if not absurd, inasmuch as it meant proceedingas if that organization that enabled them to function as “naturalpurposes” could have come about through pure chance. Alternati-vely, “organized beings” could be reckoned by way of our under-standing of “purpose” but if we were to understand all life-activityas inseparable from purposeful intention at any and every level
1M. Friedman, Kant and the exact sciences, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1992.2 E. Watkins, Kant and the metaphysics of causality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2005.3 See I. Goy - E. Watkins (eds), Kant’s theory of biology, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2014 and P. Hune-man (ed), Understanding purpose: Kant and the philosophy of biology, Rochester NY, Universi-ty of Rochester Press.4 Siegfried Roth is a notable exception whose highly detailed scientific discussions have at-tempted to defend the implicit relevance of Kant’s views if not, albeit, to renew them for pro-ductive purposes.  See for example his “Kant, Polanyi, and molecular biology” in I. Goy - E.Watkins, Kant’s theory of biology cit.
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then we would either have to posit an immanent mind in nature«all the way down» or ascribe all the activities of life to the inten-ded acts of a transcendent designer. Kant’s best solution to this di-lemma was to find a way to compromise, to formulate a «method-ology of teleology» that would best empower the explanatory sci-ences, as he understood them, to take natural explanation as far asthey could go. Kant reasoned that:If, therefore, the investigator of nature is not to work entirely in vain, hemust, in the judging of things whose concept as natural ends is indubita-bly established (organized beings), always base them on some originalorganization, which uses that mechanism itself in order to produce otherorganized forms or to develop its own new configurations (which, how-ever, always result from that end and in conformity with it)5What gave Kant the optimism that granting the prior existence ofsome form of «purposive organization» could then provide for aproductive course of research was the observation that differentlife forms bore family resemblances that suggested principles, ormechanisms, of transformation that could well be amenable toempirically lawful characterization.It is commendable to go through the great creation of organized naturesby means of a comparative anatomy in order to see whether there is notto be found therein something similar to a system, one indeed, regardingthe principle of their generation, without which we would have to settlefor the mere principle of judging (which provides no insight into theirproduction) and would have to give up claim to insight into nature in thisfield. The agreement of so many genera of animals in a certain commonschema, which seems to lie at the basis of not only their skeletal struc-ture but also of the arrangement of their other parts, and by which a re-markable simplicity of basic design has been able to produce such agreat variety of species by the shortening of one part and the elongationof another, by the involution of this part and the evolution of another, al-lows the mind at least a weak ray of hope that something may be accom-plished here with the principle of the mechanism of nature, withoutwhich there can be no natural science at all.6Beginning with his efforts to provide a model of human racial di-versification, consistent with a monogenist (what we would nowterm «monophyletic») theory of the human species, Kant brought
5 I. Kant, Critique of the power of judgment, ed. by P. Guyer, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2000, p. 287.6 Ibid.
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together both preformationist and epigenesist concepts, postulat-ing the idea of some «pre-established», «purposeful», stock of po-tential (Keime und Anlagen) that may give rise, by mechanicalmeans, to a spectrum of organismal forms. This was in effectKant’s Teleological Method put to work in biological problem solv-ing7. The explanation of life-process by way of the explanatorylaws and mechanisms at our disposal become no longer impossi-ble if one can assume an “original” organization of componentsthat can vitiate the problem of contingency. The assumption of anoriginal purposive organization of components, which is the cruxof the teleological heuristic, provides for a kind of pragmatic“bracketing”; pragmatic in the sense that it enables the explana-tory pursuit of some biological phenomena while setting asideothers. In theory, whether Kant imagined this or not, heuristic te-leological bracketing can flex and recede in tandem with new ex-planatory capacities to account for at least aspects of living pro-cesses as direct causal implications and not merely highly contin-gent outcomes.Following this line of thought, some degree of enabling te-leological bracketing would be retained so long as life itself couldnot be reinvented from non-living matter. Inasmuch as life, two-hundred and twenty-five years later, has still not been reinventedfrom non-living scratch (as in the perennially perplexing “origin oflife” research agenda), there are many questions that can be askedabout the extent to which some form of teleological bracketinghas been put to use, explicitly or implicitly, in the subsequent hi-story of biology and to what extent some form of teleological bra-cketing continues to be the most apposite approach to a produ-ctive and reflectively coherent, bio-scientific research program.The present paper will both detail an updating of our ability to gobeyond overwhelming degrees of contingency in accounting forlife processes in dynamic physiochemical terms as well offer a no-vel approach to even further reducing the need for teleologicalbracketing. En passantwe will also be making the case for the con-tinued inevitability of some form of bracketing in biological sci-ence and for the superiority of teleological bracketing to Neo-Dar-winian bracketing. We will thus be making the case for the conti-nuing centrality of Kant’s problem-solving agenda.
7 Id.,On the use of teleological principles in philosophy, in Anthropology, history and education,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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Neo-Darwinian bracketing and bracketing upon bracketingWe have suggested that some form of bracketing has been andcontinues to be an unavoidable (if not always acknowledged) de-vice in the elaboration of biological theory. In his seminal and bril-liant, but also controversial, account —The strategy of life: teleo-
logy and mechanics in nineteenth century German biology — thehistorian Timothy Lenoir attempted to demonstrate how the fur-ther extension of the use of teleological bracketing, or «teleome-chanism» enabled nothing less than the entire foundations of mo-dern biology, i.e., developmental morphology and the understan-ding of development in terms of the interaction of discrete germlayers, the discovery of the human ovum, the rudiments of fun-ctional morphology, the foundations of cell theory and physiologyand the origins of cytopathology. Be this as it may with respect tohistorical precision (more on this in the conclusion) it should notbe difficult to see how teleological bracketing can be adapted toserve as a flexible placeholder for successive steps in our advanc-ing but incomplete ability to understand the origins of purposiveform and function, not as contingent in relation to physiochemicalprocesses, but as expressions of such (even if contrary to Kant’sexpectations).An entirely different style of bracketing emerges with Dar-win, and assumes a decisive shape with the neo-Darwinian syn-thesis of Darwinism with Mendelism on the basis of populationgenetics. The gist of this is handily expressed by Patricia Kitcher inher recent review of Hannah Ginsborg: «But Darwin offered an al-ternative: the proper way to understand the contingent (with re-spect to basic laws) is in relation to the contingent – a whole se-ries of accidents». So conceived, the idea of natural selection can(and arguably did) become a far more totalizing bracket thanKant’s teleology. The positing of hypothetical gene-based variants,conceived as frozen accidents, could become indefinitely brack-eted from any accountability to questions about the contingencyof purposive function, through the mere incantation of Natural se-
lection.This biological strategy was reinforced with the disciplinaryseparation of embryology from transmission genetics in the early20th century. This division pertains especially to the particularcharacter of multicellular development. Unlike single-celled orga-nisms, which are generated by essentially identical progenitorsand for which species-characteristic goals are manifest from the
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start of their lives, the embryo is at every stage a different kind ofbeing from the animal or plant it will eventually become. While itchanges in a directional fashion according to a species-specificroutine, the “goal” of this process is not simply the maintenanceand propagation of the organism, but rather the sequential con-struction of its mature form. For biologists of the period these de-velopmental routines (later called “programs” with the rise ofcomputer science) were increasingly conceived as the embryo-stage expression of an organism’s “genes”. Genes thus in effect be-come surrogates and indefinite substitutes, for actual physico-chemical developmental process.Moreover, with the Mendelian-Darwinian «Modern Synthe-sis» in ascendancy it became nearly unquestioned to assume thatthe clearly goal-directed development of a species-specific bodyform was (despite appearances of having an internal logic of itsown) exclusively in the service of regenerating a suite of charac-ters that had been originally brought about by natural selectionacting on adult organisms. This assumption permitted anotherbracketing, this time not of the integrated, holistic character of themature organism, but of the developmental processes by which astructurally and functionally competent body is created in everygeneration. The bracketing of development is encapsulated in theassertion by the population geneticist Brian Charlesworth, a pri-me contemporary exponent of this view, that «[u]ntil we have apredictive theory of developmental genetics, our understanding ofthe molecular basis of development – however fascinating and im-portant in revealing the hidden history of what has happened in e-volution – sheds little light on what variation is potentially availa-ble for the use of selection»8.This second level of bracketing insulated Modern Synthesisstudies from exposure to developmental propensities and con-straints that could have shaped evolutionary trajectories and the-reby challenged purely adaptationist accounts. Such bracketing, instark contrast with, for example, developmental morphology roo-ted in teleological bracketing, serves only to obscure, rather thandisclose, actual phylogenetic history rooted in the developmentalprocess. This strategy has turned out to be scientifically ina-dequate for reasons that will be described below.
8 B. Charlesworth, Evolution: on the origins of novelty and variation (Review of The plausibility
of life: resolving Darwin's dilemma by Marc W. Kirschner and John C. Gerhart), «Science» 310(2005), pp. 1619-1620.
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From Newtonian mechanics to excitable soft matterBecause embryos are composed of complex materials, their deve-lopment is ultimately a problem of physics and chemistry. Themechanical paradigm formulated by Isaac Newton, which domina-ted scientific thought throughout the 18th century, held that mat-ter was inert and inertial, changing its form and position in a li-near/continuous fashion, and only when acted on by external for-ces. Although physical science was itself undergoing changes dur-ing this period, opening the way to chemistry, thermodynamics, e-lectricity and magnetism, the “unmechanical” behaviors of thenew objects of study, which exhibited qualitative transformations,irreversibility and action-at-a-distance (also a property of Newto-nian gravity) elicited skepticism in some scientifically conservati-ve circles. In fact, the dynamics of chemical and other mesoscalesystems have greater relevance to biology than clockworks andother devices constructed according to classically mechanicalprinciples. An acknowledgement of the explanatory possibilitiesinherent in the new chemistry and physics can begin to be seen inthe work of thinkers less committed to Newton’s mechanicismthan Kant, or perhaps even Darwin9. Lamarck, for example, de-scribed living tissues as being suffused by «contained» and «sub-tle» fluids (discussed in Newman and Bhat10), and rational mor-phologists like Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Lorenz Oken and RichardOwen, inspired in part by J.W. von Goethe, speculated about natu-ral «laws of form»11. But the new physical science had made fewinroads into biology at the time experimental embryology (whichfollowed the invention of the achromatic lens and formulation ofcell theory) and evolutionary theory began to emerge, despitehints of the continuities between nonliving and living matter suchas Luigi Galvani’s electrical stimulation of muscle twitching in adead frog in 1780 and Friedrich Wohler’s test tube synthesis ofurea in 1828.
9 D.J. Depew, B.H. Weber, Darwinism evolving: systems dynamics and the genealogy of natural
selection, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1995.10 S.A. Newman, R. Bhat, Lamarck's dangerous idea, in S. Gissis, E. Jablonka (eds.), Transforma-
tions of Lamarckism: from subtle fluids to molecular biology, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2011,pp. 157-169.11 G. Webster, B.C. Goodwin, Form and transformation: generative and relational principles in
biology, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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Darwin’s conventionally materialistic conception of organi-smal transformations was in keeping with the manufacturing wis-dom of the Industrial Revolution. His notion that trial and erroracting on incremental change could arrive at a functionally optim-al outcome echoed the experience of his maternal grandfather, thepottery magnate Josiah Wedgwood, who tested several thousanddifferent earthenware formulations before arriving at the one thatmade his fortune. But the major advances in the chemistry andphysics (including thermodynamics and fluid mechanics) of meso-scale matter was due to scientists active in the early 19th centurysuch as John Dalton, J.-L. Gay-Lussac, C.-L. Navier, and Sadi Carnot,who established scientific foundations for understanding qualita-tive transformations in the composition and organizational stateof materials (reviewed in Newman and Linde-Medina12). Suchchanges are of course precisely what occur during the develop-ment of a multicellular animal or plant.By the mid-twentieth century physics was profoundly differ-rent from that of Kant’s era. The most famous theoretical advan-ces were relativity and quantum theory, but these pertain to phe-nomena on larger, smaller and faster scales than those on whichbiological systems exist. More relevant to the life sciences was therise of physics of the middle scale. Among the phenomena thatcharacterize this scale of matter are nonlinear chemical oscilla-tions (with concentrations of molecules changing periodicallywith time) and multistable dynamics (with the material composi-tion settling on one or another alternative value depending on thesystem’s initial composition). Also included are transitions be-tween, and separation of, phases (particularly immiscible liquidslike oil and water), and viscous flow (characterizing differencesbetween honey, say, and alcohol). Another exotic phenomenon atthe mesoscale (studied theoretically by the mathematician AlanTuring) results from coupling between chemical reaction and dif-fusion leading to the spontaneous breaking of spatial uniformityof composition, leading to standing waves of chemical concentra-tion. Mathematical, and later, computational tools were becomingavailable that enabled formulating theories of matter that was“soft” (viscoelastic) and “excitable” (capable of storing chemical ormechanical energy that was releasable upon stimulation), or both.
12 S.A. Newman, M. Linde-Medina, Physical determinants in the emergence and inheritance of
multicellular form, «Biological Theory» 8 (2013), pp. 274-285.
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Organisms and the embryos that give rise to them consist of suchmaterials (typically in complex amalgams operating on multiplescales), but soft or excitable materials (even nonliving ones) canchange in abrupt ways, are responsive to environmental influen-ces, and typically assume preferred, though not limitless, forms(e.g., waves and vortices in water, wrinkles and cracks in driedpaint)13. While it is understandable that Kant despaired of findinga material basis for purposeful behavior, and Darwin and AlfredRussel Wallace envisioned evolutionary processes that advancedin small increments, with no jumps or preferred outcomes thesame cannot be said for 20th and 21st century life scientists. Wehave suggested that by the lights of a properly understood methodof teleological bracketing, new formulations with diminishedneeds for bracketing would and should follow from advances inour ability to see the purposiveness of living processes as no long-er merely contingent in relationship to, for example, the newphysics and chemistry of the mesoscale.
Physico-genetic mechanisms of the origination and develop-
ment of biological formDevelopmental biology has in recent decades begun to incorpora-te the physics of excitable soft materials, but not without resistan-ce. The dominant conceptual framework from mid-20th centurywas structured by the concept of a “genetic program,” which con-stituted the continuation of the type of Neo-Darwinian bracketingdiscussed above. The rise of cybernetics and the temptation to as-similate the long linear sequences of DNA embedded in chromo-somes to the software script of a Universal Turing machine led totendencies to reify and ossify the idea of the genetic program, totreat a regulative bracketing device, a placeholder, as itself as abona fide entity.Genomes of course are essential to the life of cells and to allmulticellular activities, including embryogenesis. They harbor,amongst other things, templates for the sequences of RNA andproteins, two major categories of molecules of organisms. Thecomposition of the embryo, including its complement of DNA-tem-plated molecules, changes during development, partly due to priorchanges in gene “expression” (i.e., the initiation of processes of“transcription” and “translation” resulting in the de novo synthesis
13 G. Forgacs, S.A. Newman, Biological physics of the developing embryo, Cambridge, Cam-bridge University Press, 2005.
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of peptides and proteins) but also partly due to chemical, mecha-nical and electrical changes in the cell mass occasioned by changesinternal and external to it. None of this however is tantamount tojustifying the reification of the notion of a genetic program for de-velopment, however14. But the fascination with computers begin-ning in the 1950s, the superficially apt circumstance of DNA’s en-coding sequence information in a linear fashion as on the cardsand tapes of the early cybernetic era, and the requirement of theModern Synthesis for a medium that stored hereditable variationautonomously from the organism’s other life activities, locked thefield into this misleading paradigm for several decades.At the same time, another research agenda more open tophysicalist explanations began to emerge. This can be illustratedwith three examples. One set of studies involved mixing cells deri-ved from different embryonic tissues and observing that theysorted out, first into homotypic “islands” of one cell type sur-rounded by “lakes” of the other, and then into two distinct phases,one (the more cohesive), becoming engulfed by the other (less co-hesive) one. This was interpreted as resulting from differences inthe affinity (adhesiveness) of cells of the same and different type,the same reason that droplets of immiscible liquids, oil and water,for example, separate into distinct phases15.This “liquid-tissue” model was influential in moving deve-lopmental biology away from the genetic-program paradigm, andits primary exponent, Malcolm Steinberg, explicitly referred to thethermodynamic-driven self-organization of developing tissues asproviding an alternative basis for «goal-directedness» of embryo-genesis16. These morphogenetic effects are now understood to benot simply the outcome of relative cell affinities, but to depend aswell on tension exerted on the surfaces of cells from their inte-riors17 and production by certain cells of molecular signals thatrepel other cells18.
14 L.Moss,What genes can't do, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2003.15 M.S. Steinberg, On the mechanism of tissue reconstruction by dissociated cells, I. Population
kinetics, differential adhesiveness, and the absence of directed migration, «Zool.» 48 (1962), pp.1577-1582; M.S. Steinberg, On the mechanism of tissue reconstruction by dissociated cells, III.
Free energy relations and the reorganization of fused, heteronomic tissue fragments, «Proc.Natl. Acad. Sci. USA.» 48 (1962), pp. 1769-1776.16 Id.,Goal-directedness in embryonic development, «Integrative Biology» 1 (1998), pp. 49-59.17 G.W. Brodland, The differential interfacial tension hypothesis (DITH): a comprehensive
theory for the self-rearrangement of embryonic cells and tissues, «J Biomech Eng.» 124 (2002),pp. 188-197; M. Krieg, Y. Arboleda-Estudillo, P.H. Puech, J. Kafer, F. Graner, D.J. Muller, C.P.
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The mechanisms that generate the multilayered initial stag-es (gastrulae) of animal embryos19, pancreatic islets, and tetrapodlimb buds, are therefore not entirely «generic» in that they are notprecisely the ones driving similar-appearing outcomes in non-living systems. They nonetheless can be considered «biogener-ic»20 in the sense of employing generic physical mechanisms to or-ganize biological materials (e.g., aggregates of cells) in novel ways.The example of tissue phase-separation and boundary formationsuggests that the physically explicable emergence of goal-direct-edness at a higher, and thus later-evolved, level of organization(e.g., multicellularity) can occur in a medium of earlier-evolvedbasic units (e.g., single cells) whose own origins and organization-al principles are less transparent.A second example of the new physicalist embryology invol-ves the mechanism for the generation of somites, paired blocks oftissue that emerge in a sequential head-to-tail direction duringvertebrate embryogenesis. The English biologist William Bateson,in the 1890s proposed that repetitive tissue elements, like flowerpetals, the digits of tetrapod limbs, and the somites, which giverise to the vertebrae and ribs, were determined by an underlyingoscillatory or «vibratory» process akin to that causing ripples onsand or water21. This idea was ridiculed by promoters of the neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis such as Ernst Mayr22, who consi-dered it inconsistent with the tenet that genes and genetic pro-grams were exclusively responsible for the inheritance and gene-ration of forms. In the 1970s, using advanced mathematical mod-els, the developmental biologist Jonathan Cooke and the mathe-matician Christopher Zeeman proposed a mechanism for somito-genesis that (unlike Bateson) postulated molecular componentsinteracting in plausible ways (as a “clock” and “wavefront”), al-
Heisenberg, Tensile forces govern germ-layer organization in zebrafish, in «Nat Cell Biol.» 10(2008), pp. 429-436.18 R. Winklbauer, Cadherin function during Xenopus gastrulation, «Subcell Biochem» 60(2012), pp. 301-320.19 M. Krieg, Y. Arboleda-Estudillo, P.H. Puech, J. Kafer, F. Graner, D.J. Muller, C.P. Heisenberg,
Tensile forces govern germ-layer organization in zebrafish cit.20 S.A. Newman, Physico-genetics of morphogenesis: the hybrid nature of developmental me-
chanisms, in A. Minelli, T. Pradeu (eds.), Towards a theory of development, Oxford, Oxford Uni-versity Press, 2014, pp. 95-113.21 Id.,William Bateson's physicalist ideas, in M. Laubichler, J. Maienschein (eds.), From embry-
ology to Evo-Devo: a history of evolutionary development, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2007, pp.83-107.22 E. Mayr, The growth of biological thought: diversity, evolution, and inheritance, CambridgeMA, Belknap Press, 1982.
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though the identity of the putative molecules was still completelyunknown23. Then, in the late 1990s, Olivier Pourquié and his col-leagues presented compelling experimental evidence for a me-chanism for somitogenesis, involving a demonstrable intracellularbiochemical oscillator within the cells of the segmentation-compe-tent tissue, and a wavefront consisting of a gradient of a known«morphogen» with its source at the embryo’s tail tip24. Othersprovided plausible biochemical dynamics for the underlying oscil-lation25. This turned out to be complex biogeneric processes basedon the regulated transcription and translation dynamics of geneexpression and protein synthesis rather than the simpler genericfeedback circuitry that can produce periodic effects in certain sim-ple chemical systems26.Fish, amphibians, birds, reptiles and mammals all have dif-ferent characteristic ranges of somite numbers, which are typical-ly 30-50, but can rise to more than 300 in snakes. Experimentshave suggested that the increase in number of somites in snakesoccurred by evolutionary alterations in the ratio of parameterscharacterizing the interaction of the clock and wavefront27. Wecan now revisit the Kantian concept of a stock of potential, a stockof «germs» (Keime) and «proclivities» (Anlagen) in light of currentscience. The clock-and-wavefront system in effect constitutes astock of Keime and Anlagen capable of giving rise to a wide spec-trum of forms adaptively contingent upon the life needs of partic-ular organisms. To insert the physics and chemistry of the clock-and-wavefront model into the generic placeholder space of thestock of Keime and Anlagen is not to terminate any role for teleo-logical bracketing but it is to resize and reconfigure and incremen-tally diminish the size and scope of the “bracket” in relation to thefurther elaboration of the physico-chemical dynamics which are
23 J. Cooke, E.C. Zeeman, A clock and wavefront model for control of the number of repeated
structures during animal morphogenesis, «J Theor Biol.» 58 (1976), pp. 455-476.24 I. Palmeirim, D. Henrique, D. Ish-Horowicz, O. Pourquié, Avian hairy gene expression identi-
fies a molecular clock linked to vertebrate segmentation and somitogenesis, «Cell.» 91 (1997),pp. 639-648.25 J. Lewis, Autoinhibition with transcriptional delay: a simple mechanism for the zebrafish so-
mitogenesis oscillator, «Curr Biol.» 13 (2003), pp. 1398-1408; N.A. Monk, Oscillatory expres-
sion of Hes1, p53, and NF-kappaB driven by transcriptional time delays, «Curr Biol.» 13 (2003),pp. 1409-1413.26 E.g. M.P. Orbán, P. De Kepper, I.R. Epstein, An iodine-free chlorite-based oscillator. The chlo-
rite-thiosulfate reaction in a continuous flow stirred tank reactor, «J. Phys. Chem. A.» 86(1982), pp. 431-433.27 C. Gomez, O. Pourquié,Developmental control of segment numbers in vertebrates, «Journalof Experimental Zoology Part B» 312B (2009), 6, pp. 533-544.
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by no means merely contingent in relation to the aspect of “pur-posive” development it elucidates.The third example of emergent developmental pattern for-mation based on a physical process unknown prior to the 20thcentury pertains to skeletogenesis of the tetrapod limb. Turing’sreaction-diffusion mechanism, alluded to above, published in apaper titled «The chemical basis of morphogenesis»28, showedthat a balance of positive and negative feedbacks in an open chem-ical system (essentially identical to networks that generate tem-poral oscillations like that in the somitogenesis model), coupledwith differences in the rates of diffusion of the key reactive mole-cules (i.e., morphogens), could produce stable patterns consistingof multiple peaks and valleys of molecular concentration. (Ironi-cally and regettabily, Turing’s earlier pre-biological computation-theoretic concepts established a strong influence in biological de-velopment decades before his more biologically apt theories be-gan to be appreciated). Because the vertebrate limb skeleton is ar-ranged in a quasi-periodic fashion (e.g., the single humerus boneof the forelimb, followed by the radius and ulna pair, the rows ofwrist bones, and then the digits), it lends itself to a natural in-terpretation in terms of a Turing-type mechanism sustained in theexcitable medium of the limb bud mesenchyme, with the mole-cular peaks inducing skeletal tissue29. Key aspects of the skeletalpatterns of mutant and fossil limbs can be accounted for by theassumption that the limb pattern is formed by a reaction-diffusiontype mechanism30. As with the phase-separation of adjoining tis-sues during gastrulation with both «reaction» and «diffusion» be-ing realized in more complex biological fashion than the chemicalversions discussed by Turing31.More generally, the production of the basic morphologicalmotifs of animal body plans and organs can be understood in
28 A.M. Turing, The chemical basis of morphogenesis, «Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Lond. B.» 237(1952), pp. 37-72.29 S.A. Newman, H.L. Frisch, Dynamics of skeletal pattern formation in developing chick limb,«Science» 205 (1979), pp. 662-668.30 J. Zhu, Y.T. Zhang, M.S. Alber, S.A. Newman, Bare bones pattern formation: a core regulatory
network in varying geometries reproduces major features of vertebrate limb development and
evolution, «PLoS One.» 5 (2010), e10892.31 Ibid.; T. Glimm, R. Bhat, S.A. Newman, Modeling the morphodynamic galectin patterning
network of the developing avian limb skeleton, «J Theor Biol.» 346 (2014), pp. 86-108; J. Ras-popovic, L. Marcon, L. Russo, J. Sharpe,Modeling digits. Digit patterning is controlled by a Bmp-
Sox9-Wnt Turing network modulated by morphogen gradients, «Science» 345 (2014), pp. 566-570.
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terms of «dynamical patterning modules» (DPMs): associations ofthe gene products of the interaction toolkit and the novel physicaleffects they mobilize (toward novel and emergent ends) in thecontext and on the scale of cell aggregates32. In modern animalsthe DPMs are biogeneric components of the self-organizing pro-cesses – adhesion and differential adhesion, cell polarization (e.g.,making one end different from the other), lateral inhibition (mak-ing adjoining cells assume different states), gradient formation(making different regions of the cell cluster experience differentchemical influences), and so forth – that drive embryonic patternformation and morphogenesis. Moreover, although the physicalprocesses and forces embodied in the DPMs are features of thenatural world that are independent of the emergence of animalsor any other life form, the particular molecules that first mobilizedthese processes in holozoan multicellular aggregates had specificorigins in time and space. These molecules and the DNA that pre-serves their sequences (the DPM-associated «interaction tool-kit»33), furthermore, are so entrenched in the developmental re-pertoire of the animals, that they are essentially interchangeablein organisms as evolutionarily divergent as fruit-flies, round-worms and humans34. The findings and concept of DPMs allow forboth a revisiting and further articulation of the neo-Kantian pers-pective. DPMs can be thought of as a new stock of Keime and Anla-
gen albeit with a difference inasmuch as a major transitions in life-forms can begin to be analyzed in terms of continuities and dis-continuities in DPMs and the space of possibilities that they intro-duce. DPMs are always already contained within a cellular, i.e.,«organized» context of which they are not the source, so are stillwithin the framework of a teleological bracket, and yet can beseen to be providing the resources for the de novo appearance ofwhole spectra of new life forms.The self-organizational mechanisms that mold and patternthe bodies and organs of animals and other multicellular organ-
32 S.A. Newman, R. Bhat, Dynamical patterning modules: physico-genetic determinants of mor-
phological development and evolution, «Phys. Biol.» 5 (2008), 15008; id., Dynamical pattern-
ing modules: a "pattern language" for development and evolution of multicellular form, «Int JDev Biol.» 53 (2009), pp. 693-705.33 S.A. Newman, R. Bhat, N.V. Mezentseva, Cell state switching factors and dynamical pattern-
ing modules: complementary mediators of plasticity in development and evolution, «J Biosci.»34 (2009), pp. 553-572.34 S.B. Carroll, Endless forms most beautiful: the new science of evo devo and the making of the
animal kingdom, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 2005.
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isms (typically combinations of DPMs) in some cases representoriginating biogeneric physical processes that remain active inpresent-day forms. Most often, however, embryogenesis of extantorganisms is driven by «hybrid» mechanisms, in which processesthat were active in ancestral forms have become reinforced bysubsequent evolution, but have left traces of their origination, par-ticularly in terms of morphology35. Because the earliest ancestorsof Metazoa (the organismal kingdom that contains all extant andextinct animals) were just clusters of cells, the most primitive de-velopmental mechanisms were likely more exclusively based inthe physics of soft, excitable materials (to which the clusterswould have been inescapably subject) than are the highly evolvedmechanisms of present-day development.The mid-20th century developmental biologist C.H. Wadding-ton referred to developmental processes as «canalized» if theyembody fail-safe mechanisms that keep morphogenesis on-trackto a species-specific outcome even when perturbed36. Thus, whileancient cell clusters may have been caused by self-organizationalbiogeneric effects such as phase separation, oscillation, and reac-tion-diffusion coupling to become multilayered, segmented andotherwise patterned, these earliest prototypes of animal bodiesand organs were still to be transformed by canalizing evolution in-to modern, stable organismal “types,” each generated by a pur-poseful (in the sense of the end-state being embodied in the ma-terial and its dynamics) developmental process.Just how far can we now push back the teleological brackettoward the origins of “organized beings”? The fossil record sug-gests a relatively sudden emergence of primitive animals duringthe late Precambrian and early Cambrian periods37. Sheet-like andhollow spherical forms38, and budding and segmented tubes39 are
35 S.A. Newman, Physico-genetics of morphogenesis: the hybrid nature of developmental me-
chanisms, in A. Minelli, T. Pradeu (eds.), Towards a theory of development, Oxford, Oxford Uni-versity Press, 2014, pp. 95-113.36 C.H. Waddington, Canalization of development and the inheritance of acquired characters,«Nature» 150 (1942), pp. 563-565.37 C. Larroux, G.N. Luke, P. Koopman, D.S. Rokhsar, S.M. Shimeld, B.M. Degnan, Genesis and
expansion of metazoan transcription factor gene classes, «Mol Biol Evol.» 25 (2008), pp. 980-996; A. Rokas, D. Kruger, S.B. Carroll, Animal evolution and the molecular signature of radia-
tions compressed in time, «Science» 310 (2005), pp. 1933-1938.38 L. Yin, M. Zhu, A.H. Knoll, X. Yuan, J. Zhang, J. Hu, Doushantuo embryos preserved inside di-
apause egg cysts, «Nature» 446 (2007), pp. 661-663.39 M.L. Droser, J.G. Gehling, Synchronous aggregate growth in an abundant new Ediacaran tu-
bular organism, «Science» 319 (2008), pp. 1660-1662.
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seen in Precambrian Ediacaran deposits beginning about 630 mil-lion years ago. Within a 10 million year period beginning around575 million years ago (the so-called Avalon explosion40) thesponges and diploblastic (body plans consisting of two tissue lay-ers) cnidarians (corals, hydroids) and ctenophores (comb jellies)arose, and essentially all the triploblastic (three-layered bodyplans) metazoans followed within a space of no more than 20 mil-lion years, beginning about 535 million years ago (the well-knownCambrian explosion41). Fishes with paired fins emerged morethan 500 million years ago, giving rise to lobe-finned fish (includ-ing tetrapods) beginning roughly 80 million years afterwards. Wenow understand (in principle) the DPMs and related processes re-sponsible for the origination of each these morphological motifs,which constitute, in their generic predictability, the Keime, and intheir parametric variability, the Anlage, of animal body plans andorgan forms.
Conclusion: teleological bracketing today, and the purposes
of KantKant provided a template for the productive mutual interpenetra-tion of philosophy and the empirical investigation of living phe-nomena that has remained underappreciated, despite the recentflourishing of Anglophone interest in the philosopher. In largemeasure this is due to the contemporary disciplinary landscape,where a problem-solving orientation in the life sciences and a fa-miliarity with Kant exist as two independent variables that areseldom united. The salient exception to this was the remarkableeffort of the historian Timothy Lenoir to carve out an appreciationfor a distinctively Kantian biological methodology and the role itplayed in the monumental advances made in nineteenth-centuryGerman biology42. Whether or not Lenoir entirely succeeded inreconstructing a coherent Kant-inspired «teleomechanist» re-search program originating in the 1790’s and extending throughthe first half of the 19th century43, the history we have presented
40 B. Shen, L. Dong, S. Xiao, M. Kowalewski, The Avalon explosion: evolution of Ediacara mor-
phospace, «Science» 319 (2008), pp. 81-84.41 S. Conway Morris, Darwin's dilemma: the realities of the Cambrian 'explosion', «Philos TransR Soc Lond B Biol Sci.» 361 (2006), pp. 1069-1083.42 T. Lenoir, The strategy of life: teleology and mechanics in nineteenth century German biology,Dordrecht, Holland - Boston, U.S.A., D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1982.43 See K. Caneva, Teleology with regrets, «Annals of Science» 47 (1990), pp. 291–300; R.J. Ri-chards, «Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci.» 31 (2000), pp. 11–32; J.H. Zammito, The Lenoir
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above of the pragmatic bracketings that have accompanied thepursuit of scientific biology in the last two centuries amply con-firm Lenoir’s mains insights.We have been arguing in this paper for the benefits of a flex-ible appropriation of Kant’s «methodology of teleology» for use ina philosophically reflective and informed biological problem solv-ing practice. From this perspective the fact that the understandingof the teleological aspect of the program underwent reconsidera-tions and changes in tandem with new developments in microsco-py, organic chemistry, enzymology, thermodynamics and rheology(and in our time the nonlinear physics and chemistry of mesos-cale, soft, excitable matter and molecular biology) is not only notan impediment to the argument but exactly what one would hopeand expect. In its earliest formations the status of that ostensiblypurposive organization that Kant suggested we had to take, heuri-
stically, as a given, was subject to alternative interpretations. Orig-inally referred to as a Bildungstrieb by Blumenbach, and later mo-re generally as a Lebenskraft, this was sometimes understood asthe source of a novel “force” (and where a Lebenskraft had occa-sion to be posited as a real force which was itself responsible forliving organization de novo, then there would be justification forseeing the demarcation between Kantian teleomechanism and Ro-
mantische Naturphilosophie as having become blurred). To the ex-tent that such “slippage” from the Kantian ideal may have influ-enced the thinking of the likes of von Baer and Müller it did nothowever prevent them from the most outstanding problem-sol-ving successes measured in the most materialist of terms. But e-ven more to the point, the fact that forty to fifty years after Kant’sformulations, explicit further self-reflections and clarifications ofthe meaning of a the Lebenskraft in light of ongoing advances inthe physico-chemical sciences attests to the vigor and durability ofKant’s formulations.In the 1830’s these ambiguities in the conception of the Lebenskraft became asource of concern, a primary result of advances in organic and physiologicalchemistry. A principal advance in establishing the meaning and limits of thenotion of Lebenskraft was made by Berzelius and Liebig. Their work reins-tated the importance of conceiving Lebenskraft as the expression of a complexinterrelation of material parts incapable of further analysis but inseparable
thesis revisited: Blumenbach and Kant, «Stud. His. Phil. Biol. Biomed. Sci» 43 (2012), pp. 120-132. But also P. Sloan, Buffon, German biology, and the historical interpretation of biological
species, «British J. Hist. Sci.» 12 (1979), pp. 109–153.
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from the order and arrangement of matter.  Lebenskraft was to be understoodas the expression of this state of affairs rather than its sustaining cause, andthe object of physiology was understood to consist in the investigation of thelawlike effects of this state of organization.44In the Neo-Darwinian picture, which we have argued is obliviousto Kant’s central insights, programs for multicellular embryogene-sis and homeostasis are produced exclusively by random muta-tion coupled to opportunistic adaptation and written in the lan-guage of genes. In contrast, in the physico-genetic paradigm wepropose to replace it with, there are purposeful routines and pro-cesses of development and function, but no “genetic programs”per se. In the newer view, the elaborate, highly integrated and ca-nalized mechanisms that shape and pattern present-day animals(and the analogous ones in plants and fungi), which mediate thepurposeful trajectories of development, emerged over time, hav-ing their origins in physically generic, self-organizational effectsacting on ancestral cell clusters. These effects were harnessed,stabilized and canalized by these clusters utilizing specific geneproducts (different in the different kingdoms) that happened to beavailable at the time. The understanding informed by these newfindings and concepts is of an evolutionary process that has grad-ually turned the outcomes of material and efficient (generic andbiogeneric) causes into the formal and final causes of present-dayorganismal development.As we turn from an increasingly discredited view of evolu-tion based upon the accretion of random frozen mutational acci-dents to an evolutionary-developmental perspective, informed bythe latest work in the physics and chemistry at the mesoscale, wehave good reason to resume our conversation with Kant about thebenefits of employing a method of flexible and responsible teleo-logical bracketing in our philosophically informed, biological pro-blem-solving practice.
44 T. Lenoir, The strategy of life: teleology and mechanics in nineteenth century German biology,Dordrecht-Boston, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1982, p. 160.
